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Про битву в Яванском море

Denis_469: Решил сделать тему про битву в Яванском море. Вчера попались оригинальные документы американских кораблей участвовавших в той битве. Ничего общего с официальным современным описанием, кроме названий кораблей, там найдено не было. Доклад с американского тяжёлого крейсера "Houston" как пример. Попробуйте найти общее с официальным современным описанием: "On Friday afternoon February 27, 1942, the Allied striking force was returning to Soerabaja after making a sweep of the Java Sea north of Medoera Island the previous night in search of a Japanese force. The enemy fleet had not been found and the only contact with the Japanese had been a bombing attack in the morning with no damage to the Allied ships. The Houston was in readiness, "condition II". Two of the Houston's planes had been damaged during previous bombings, and one had failed to rejoin the ship after the bombing on 16 February. The only remaining serviceable plane had been left on Soerabaja the evening before, as a night action wax expected. The striking force consisted of five cruisers and nine destroyers as listed below: De Ruyter (SOP Admiral Doorman) Dutch light cruiser Exeter British Houston American heavy cruiser Perth Australian heavy cruiser Java Dutch light cruiser Electra British light cruiser Jupiter British destroyer Encounter British destroyer Witte de Witte Dutch destroyer Kortenaer Dutch destroyer Paul Jones American destroyer Edsel American destroyer Edwards American destroyer Ford American destroyer At about 1330 just outside of Soerabaja the Houston fired on a plane with Japanese markings, which resembled a "Lockheed Hudson." Only about a dozen rounds were fired; no hits were observed and the plane turned away without pressing home the attack. About 1415 a PBY reported by radio a Japanese force of cruisers, destroyers, and transports, in the vicinity of Bawean Island and heading south. By this time we were in the mine fields of the Soerabaja approaches. At about 1515 the Allied Force turned and head north to intercept the enemy. At about 1530 we went to A.A. defence when three planes resembling our SOC's were sighted. These planes were not fired on, as they did not come within range. We went to general quarters at about 1535 when the masts of some ships were sighted hull down bearing about 020 degrees relative. The formation of the Allied cruisers was column 180 degrees in this order: De Ruyter, Exeter, Houston, Perth, Java. Course was about 350, speed about 28 knots. The formation continued on its course closing the enemy for about fifteen minutes before the action started. At about 1555 the opened fire and the Houston about three or four minutes later. The targets were Japanese light cruisers which were just coming into range ahead and about 2 points on the starboard bow. Our force made a column movement to the left about 60 degrees and the head of the column came under fire from two more enemy ships bearing about 30 degrees to the right of the light cruisers. These were apparently heavy cruisers and were thought to be of the Tone class. The Exeter and Houston immediately shifted their fire to these new targets and each took one ship. The Houston had fired only two or three salvos before this shift and apparently scored no hits. The opening gun range on the Japanese heavy cruiser was about 32,000 yds. The courses of the two forces were almost parallel but converging slightly. The Allied cruisers were in column, distance 600 yds., speed about 28 knots, course about 280 T or 290 T. When the battle started the destroyers on either side of the column changed position; one or two going ahead of the column and the others going astern. The Japanese forces were in three groups: two heavy cruisers bearing about 070 R, two light cruisers with their destroyers bearing about 030 R. At the beginning of the firing the enemy concentrated their fire at the head of our column and the Houston was not under fire for about the first fifteen minutes. The Allied column of cruisers was zig-zagging but with no plan. All ships followed the motions of the De Ruyter, which was changing course without signal about 10 degrees to either side of the firing course about every ten or fifteen minutes. About 1620 the Houston began hitting her target. One of the forward turrets blew up and large fires were started in the waist of the ship. She slowed, turned away, and ceased firing. At this time she was partially obscured behind her own smoke, much of which was coming from her stack. At this time there had been no hits apparent on the Exeter's target, so the Houston shifted her fire to that ship. After about ten salvos our original target had come back into line and resumed fire; whereupon the Houston shifted back to her own target. The Houston apparently scored no hits on the Exeter's target and never established the hitting range on her own target again. At about the time that we shifted targets, the firing became very erratic in deflection. Spot I thought at first that his spots weren't being applied, but this was not the case. Plot thought that they had a bad set-up and obtained a new one. Deflection was still erratic and control was shifted to director II and spot II; but director II could not bear. Control was returned to spot I and director I. Subsequently it was determined that an electrical lead to director I in the foremast was badly frayed or broken. This faulty transmission together with severe whip in the mast due to high speed continuous firing was apparently the cause of erratic deflection. At about the time the Houston shifted fire back to her original target, the Exeter was hit by shell fire. At this time the Houston had fired about 70 salvos. The Exeter was hit somewhere in the firerooms and had her speed reduced to about 12 or 15 knots. On being hit she slowed and turned left about 45 degrees, falling out of column. To avoid the Exeter when she slowed and turned, the Houston turned left about 90 degrees. The Perth passed astern of us and laid a smoke screen between the Exeter and the enemy. At this time the Japanese launched a destroyer attack. The Exeter was smoking badly at this time; the Houston made another turn left about 90 degrees and emerged from the Perth's and Exeter's smoke and sighted the incoming destroyers. During the brief interval of visibility we fired one salvo with the main battery at the incoming destroyers, estimated range 13,500 yds. The salvo landed apparently on in range but off in deflection; then the targets were obscured by smoke and Houston herself commenced smoking for a short time. The incoming destroyers apparently launched their torpedoes at maximum range because several were seen to porpoise one or two hundred hards short of the Houston, and one was reported to have hit somewhere in the port quarter without exploding. Simultaneously with the destroyer attack, enemy submarines attacked from a previously-unengaged side. It is uncertain which fired the torpedoes that sank two destroyers. No other ships were hit by torpedoes, although an amazing number were seen. At about this time the De Ruyter ordered the Allied destroyers to attack the enemy battle line. They launched their torpedoes from extreme range and oo hits were apparent, although smoke prevented our seeing much of the attack. The Exeter left the scene of action for Soerabaja, making about 15 knots, escorted by one Dutch destroyer. The Houston emerged from the smoke screen just after the destroyer attack. We were on an easterly course and opened fire on the two heavy cruisers, now to port. About this time the Houston was hit by a shell which hit 9" inboard at frame 14 on the port side of the forecastle. It penetrated the forecastle deck, the main deck, the second deck and emerged through the starboard side of the ship about 3" below the second deck. The shell did not explode but partially broke up before emerging. Considerable water was taken through the hole in the side while steaming at high speed during the evening and night. A fragment of the shell was found stamped with a "6", but the hole through the forecastle deck was about 8" in diameter. The hole in the side was about 18" x 32". The only other damage from the enemy was from a near miss, port side aft, at frame 115 near the water's edge. This dished in the side somewhat, ruptured a bulkhead in fuel oil tank C-9 and contaminated the oil with salt water, flooded D-14A, and wrecked some machinery in the laundry. We fired about 30 salvos (range 18,000 to 20,000 yds.) during this phase and the action ended at dusk. Our original target (heavy cruiser) was no longer returning our fire, and she was burning badly, principally from two turrets. No damage was apparent to the other cruiser, although she is believed to have been under fire from our light cruisers. During the action a Japanese plane (apparently from one of the cruisers) was overhead continuously, flying up and down our column on the unengaged side, never coming within range of our A.A. battery (shortest range observed 16,000 yds.) At least one enemy ship (light cruiser) was sunk by Allied bombers during the action. Nothing else is known of Allied air activity. None of the Allied cruisers launched planes. The Allied force turned to the north headed for a reported group of transports. About 2045, sighted two cruisers to port. Fired 10 or 12 star shells at maximum range but were short of the target. Fired one salvo from turret 2, range 15,000 yds., a good salvo, very close. The Perth and De Ruyter also fired one or two salvos, no hits apparent. The enemy ships fired two or three salvos at the Houston with no illumination. They were very close, but no damage done. This action lasted only a few minutes before the enemy ships were lost in darkness. We continued towards Bawean Island coming very close to it about 2100, at which time the Java and De Ruyter were hit apparently by torpedoes. For about 20 minutes or half an hour we had been illuminated off and on by flares. The Jupiter was torpedoed several miles astern of u, send message "Am Torpedoed". The flash could be seen from the Houston. Orders from Admiral were that the cruisers should not stop to pick up survivors, so the Houston and the Perth headed west for Batavia, speed about 28 knots, column astern, Perth leading, zig-zagging without plan. The Java's fires lasted only a short time, but the De Ruyter was burning fiercely until we were out of sight. Subsequently survivors from the De Ruyter said that the Java sank in eight minutes, and that the De Ruyter burned for two hours. No more was seen of the Jupiter after the first flash when she was hit. There were no more enemy contacts that night. On the morning of February 28, secured from General Quarters at dawn, and set condition II in the A.A. Battery. During the morning several planes were sighted. Some resembled P-40's, others were twin float seaplanes. Identification was not positive but they were believed to be friendly and no shots were fired. Arrived off Batavia about 1200 and docked about 1300. Shifted ammunition from turret 3 forward. Commenced fueling as soon as possible (about 1500). Considerable delay was experienced because of damage ashore from bombings. Welded patch on the hole forward. no repairs were necessary aft. The Captain went aboard the Perth for a conference while we were fueling. Got underway about 1930 in company with Perth. Received a message saying the only enemy in the vicinity was 60 miles to the northeast on an easterly course. Dutch destroyer Evartsen left in port. Perth ordered her to follow as soon as she could get underway. Evartsen replied that she could not get underway for about an hour. Set condition II in the Main Battery and in the A.A. Battery. Turret I manned, powder train filled. Five inch battery divided with flight deck guns on forward director, boat deck guns on after director. Boat deck guns to be used for illumination and ready boxes contained mostly star shells. Flight deck ready boxes filled with common shell. Speed about 22 knots. At 2315 Toppers Island light plainly in view on starboard bow. Sighted ships. Perth leading challenged and Jap destroyer fired a red Very star. Perth opened fire. General Quarters on Houston and turret I opened fire on Jap destroyer (about 500 yds.) and fired about two of three salvos before turret I joined. Spot I director I in control. Reversed course to right and began maneuvering behind Perth following on various courses and speeds. The enemy seemed to have cruisers and destroyers close to shore covering landing operations with cruisers and destroyers outboard as guards. No number of enemy ever accurately know. Fight developed into a melee, Houston guns engaged on all sides, ranges never greater than 5,000 yds.. No known record of ships sunk, but following day revealed three transports beached (one either seaplane tender or motor torpedo boat tender). Japanese destroyers illuminated with searchlights from all sides. Houston main battery shifted to director II once but crew there was blinded by our own 5 inch clashes. Tried local controlling turrets once but turning and twisting at high speed prevented picking up targets so fire was shifted back to Director I and Spot I. First major hit received on Houston was a salvo in after engine room which burst steam lines -- all after engine room personnel believed killed. Secured #3 and #4 fire rooms when pressure dropped to 170 lbs. and lost feed water. Steam escaped up engine room ventilators and filled #2 mess hall. After midships repair party secured after engine room steam stopped. Steam forced 5 inch guns on boat deck, director II and aft AA director personnel to abandon stations temporarily. Boat deck guns later resumed fire. Hit on forecastle deck set paint locker on fire, which continued to burn. Turret II hit by shell which did not explode, in face plate just as powder was exposed for loading 28th salvo causing fire which caught powder train as far as powder circle. Central station ordered turret magazines flooded which put turret I out of action. Fire in turret II extinguished. Received 2 (3?) torpedo hits to starboard and one to port. One under #1 1.1" mount fired by MTB from about 1,000 yds., another below boat from destroyer, third believed under starboard catapult. Machine gun nests and some 5" guns continued to fire until all ammunition expended. Last rounds fired were star shells fired as surface ammunition. As firing from Houston decreased Japanese destroyers became bolder and approached within 1,500 to 2,000 yds., increasing fire. Abandon ship passed. SHells hit communication deck passageway behind Radio I demolishing #1 1.1" mount and fatally wounding Captain. Japanese destroyers machine-gunned quarter deck and port hangar causing great loss of life. Final hit was delivered on port side by MTB which caused ship to roll to starboard beam and sink about 0300 March 1st. Perth had sunk about 20 minutes earlier. Evartsen did not catch up, but believed sunk later the same night attempting to get through Sunda Straits. Actual sinking of ship was slow enough to permit any unwounded men to get in the water and clear of ship, although some may have been killed by shells and torpedoes in the water." Вторая часть: "Clouds very low this A.M. One enemy bomber started to make a run on us but was driven off by gunfire. Headed into Soerabaja. At 1550 A.A. defense sounds. Ship turned and headed back into the channel again. Admiral Doorman (Dutch) in the De Ruyter sent out a message "Prepare to meet the enemy" c/c NNE c/s 28 knots. Two Dutch destroyers on the bows of our force acting as scouts. The main force was formed in a single column with the De Ruyter in the lead. Exeter, Houston, Perth, Java and the destroyers on the flanks and astern. One of the Dutch cans came back and reported the enemy to stbd. Our formation went to full speed (33 knots). As soon as the enemy was sighted the De Ruyter changed course to port about 45 degrees to parallel the course of the enemy whose formation speed was about 30 knots. The enemy main body consisted of a heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, six destroyers and three more light cruisers all in column with another column of three cruisers on the far side of them, then a line of transports and another line of three cruisers. The Houston had the longest range guns so opened fire first at 28,500 yds. On our third salvo we obtained a direct hit and on the tenth salvo our target burst into flames. (The Perth spotting officer made the statement that our first target was a battleship). This ship was seen no more after it burst into flames so we believe it was sunk. We shifted targets to the second ship in column (cruiser) and after a few salvos it started to smoke all over as though the whole inside of the ship was afire. The smoke towered upward thousands of feet and she pulled out of line. About this time we ran into a nest of enemy submarines. On our stbd side a Dutch destroyer had been hit square amidships by a torpedo and had broken in half with the bow and stern sticking out of the water. I recall a man standing on the stem waved as we went by and a man hanging onto the port screw. Then both parts sank very quickly. Horrible. One of the Limey destroyers came around our stern and dropped some depth charges and pieces of a sub flew a hundred feet in the air. The destroyer never even paused but came up our stbd side and right abeam of us launched a torpedo which looked like it was headed for our bow. About halfway between us and the destroyer another sub went sky high. That destroyer was certainly efficient. During this time the Houston had dodged six torpedoes and the Exeter had been hit by a 10-gun salvo aft near the water line which reduced her speed to twelve knots. She was ordered to retire from the scene and pick up survivors. We laid a very heavy smoke screen as cover for the Exeter and the enemy did likewise. We got clear of the submarine trap as quick as we could. I wish to mention also that when the battle started the Perth ran up her battle flags on the fore and main and they looked fine. Our Navy stopped using them a long time ago. After laying the smoke screen we lost contact with the enemy. Half the A.A. battery was secured in order to move ammunition from turret 3, which had been useless since the bomb hit, to turrets 1 and 2 which had expended over nine hundred rounds of ammunition. We were dangerously low on 8" and 5" ammunition. As a result of this day battle the liners of the guns of both turrets were sticking out beyond the muzzles approximately two inches. Our force was headed for Batavia at 30 knots. We were carrying a stern wave about 7 feet high and stretching out 500 yds. on either side. At 2300 flares started dropping over our battle line. There appeared to be about six or seven flares tied together and the flares paralleled our course. They lit as they hit the water so were evidently made of calcium. About this time the De Ruyter, which was just ahead of us, seemed to explode up forward. Then followed four or five large explosions in rapid succession. We knew then that her magazines had exploded. Her whole foc'sle was ablaze and we had to swerve very sharply else we would have hit her. Right after we resumed our course there appeared about a dozen splashes on each side of our fantail. Each group of splashes covered a diameter of 10 or 12 feet and we did not know if it was shellfire or bombs (It is still a matter for argument). At almost the same time the Java, which was astern of the Perth, was also hit. I happened to be looking back at her at the exact time she was hit and it seemed as though her whole foc'sle exploded. Flames and debris could be seen flying a hundred feet in the air. There followed several explosions with each one looking like fireworks on July 4th. Then the Perth and the Houston were alone as our destroyers had left earlier for an attack on the transports. The flares stopped dropping shortly after this attack. Long about this time we passed through clouds of swimming soldiers. They were blowing whistles and shouting at us. A lot of them were on life rafts or debris and a hell of a lot more were just swimming around. We learned later that our bombers had attacked their transports. It was then we realized we could not hope to stop the invasion unless we had a lot of help. We had already lost the De Ruyter, Java, Jupiter, Electra and one British destroyer. The Exeter was severely damaged but we did not lose any American destroyers. G.Q. all night." ************************ Все видят описание наличия "вражеских подводных лодок" и противолодочных действий эсминцев. И где оно в современном описании битвы? А нет ничего даже отдалённо. Ни слова про участие в бою подводных лодок. Кстати описания с американских эсминцев также читал и те доложили про потопление аж 2 японских подводных лодок. Кстати про подводные лодки. Там крейсер сообщает, что вошли в завесу вражеских подводных лодок. Только вот вражескими они не были, но в ходе хаоса битвы приняли союзную эскадру за японскую и атаковали её потопив 2 эсминца своей эскадры. А завесой "японских подводных лодок" была группа (завеса) голландских подводных лодок "K-VIII", "K-X" и "O-19" получивших приказ найти и атаковать японское десантное соединение. Текст радиограммы: "Convoy concentrated to 39 transports in two column, 1500 yards between columns, course north, speed ten. 3 destroyers in column right flank, 1000 yards. 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers in column left flank 1000 yards. 2 cruisers and six destroyers concentrating on convoy at high speed positions probably, Lat 05-36S, Long 112-46E/0227 1842". И вот в завесу голландских подводных лодок союзная эскадра и вошла успешно. Подводники приняли её за вражескую и атаковали. Эсминца эскадры в ответ бомбили подводные лодки. Чему есть полное подтверждение. Не потопление конечно, но всё-таки: подводная лодка "K-X" "During the late afternoon and evening K X is twice detected by Japanese destroyers and depth charged and shelled. Some damage was inflicted on the submarine but the material state of K X was very bad and several leaks occured making depth control very difficult." В течении дня лодка была обнаружена японскими эсминцами и атакована. Были нанесены некоторые повреждения. А вот описание из доклада американского тяжёлого крейсера: "One of the Limey destroyers came around our stern and dropped some depth charges and pieces of a sub flew a hundred feet in the air." Один из эсминцев обошёл вокруг кормы {крейсера} и сбросил несколько глубинных бомб и куски подводной лодки взлетели на сотни футов вверх. Кстати могу сказать, что во время этой битвы в Яванском море японских подводных лодок не было вообще. Кроме указанных 3 голландских подводных лодок в море была также 1 американская, которая ночью следующего дня спасала экипаж потопленного английского эсминца и сама была атакована другим английским эсминцем и 2 английские подводные лодки стоявшие в базе и в море не находившиеся. Можно было бы запостить показания с американских эсминцев, но это лишнее. И так понятно, что современная официальная история полностью лжива в описании битвы. Хотя лично я понимаю, почему она написана так, а не по-правде. Так как если писать по правде, то нужно будет сказать, что свои подводные лодки атаковали свою эскадру и потопили два своих эсминца помогая противнику одержать победу в битве. Кто в США и на западе такое будет вообще писать? Вот потому и переврали всё описание битвы.

Ответов - 1

morehod: Интересно.



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